Police perception and use of SoMe - information in crime investigations

1. Purpose of the study
Increasingly, information from social media platforms – for short: SoMe platforms – is considered easily accessible, cost-efficient and relevant information for police investigators. The focus of this study is to scrutinize how Danish and Swedish Police use information from social media in the course of conducting crime investigations.

2. Data and method
The study consists of eight qualitative group interviews with crime investigators in eight chosen (and geographically spread) districts in the Danish and Swedish Police amounting to 27 informants in total.

3. Main findings
Everyone uses SoMe as sources of information:
· All the informants access and use information from SoMe-platforms in their investigational work. Mostly, SoMe-platforms are used to provide information about citizens’ whereabouts and relations, which is described as useful background information in crime cases.

Lack of practical priority:
· In view of the value of SoMe-information in investigations and their widespread use, the informants describe the area as downsized. This is so both in terms of the training of police staff’s digital competences, as well as in relation to the technical aspects such as access to stand-alone machines and VPN-solutions.

Focus on personal and operational security:
· The fear of exposing either oneself or ongoing investigations when accessing e.g. the social media profiles of suspects in the course of crime investigations is the main concern amongst the informants. Almost all informants access information on social media via fake profiles so-called avatars instead of private/personal profiles. They do so in order to avoid that their police identity is exposed or that the person, whose profile is accessed will appear as a friend suggestion (and vice-versa).

Active avatars:
· As a contrast to the “passive” use of fake profiles described above, some of the informants likewise use their avatars more actively in order to obtain information on citizens, which is not publicly available via open profiles. Hence, some informants befriend citizens via their avatars and apply for membership to closed groups. The informants generally describe the step as legally unproblematic, but as very time consuming since it requires a lot of resources to maintain a trustworthy fake profile.

Blurry legal boundaries:
· The majority of the informants describe the legal framework concerning the access and use of SoMe-information in investigations as vague and unclear. Many informants are afraid of making mistakes due to this vagueness and undaridity and they fear that they might compromise their professional authority. Especially, the informants describe the legal limits concerning the active use of avatars in investigations as unclear, and they generally find it difficult to define when such steps qualifies as infiltration and agent work and thus as a no-go for ordinary investigators. The informants request better guidelines – both legally and technically - in order to know how to act and navigate correctly in the digital space.
Comprehensive resilience governance

Strengthening individual adaptation capacities as part of a comprehensive security framework; co-resonance

1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The objective of the CO-RESONANCE project was to study the interface of individual and societal resilience in the context of a comprehensive security model in Finland. The project produced a model for monitoring and assessing individual resilience capacities.

2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS & METHOD
- How should resilience be defined in the context of a Finnish comprehensive security model?
- How should the relationship between institutional and individual resilience be structured?
- How should individual resilience be assessed, monitored and improved in Finnish society?

Methods: qualitative meta-analysis of multidisciplinary resilience studies and workshops for practitioners

3. MAIN FINDINGS
- Quality early childhood (education) key for individual resilience
- Individual and community level resilience are tightly coupled with social trust and societal cohesion, both of which can be enhanced by reducing social inequalities and increasing pathways for societal and political participation
- Investments in the redundancy (overlapping support systems) of critical infrastructure is essential in order to maintain the basic functions of society during crises
- Questions on environmental security and resource scarcity should be integrated more clearly to the comprehensive security model

Resilience understood as a societal process

“INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY LEVEL RESILIENCE ARE TIGHTLY COUPLED WITH SOCIAL TRUST AND SOCIETAL COHESION”
Connecting Dots: On the Aggregation of Disaster Risk Information

1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
To understand what aggregating disaster risk information entails as well as the challenges and opportunities involved in trying to do it.

2. CHALLENGES WITH DISASTER RISK INFORMATION
Aggregation: The processes of collecting and synthesizing disaster risk information from different actors. A prerequisite for doing this in an efficient way is to know which information one needs and where to find it. This requires in-depth knowledge of one’s functional dependencies as well as of the direct and indirect effects of a vast range of societal perturbations.

- Barriers in inter-organizational risk communication: The need to conceal sensitive information, competition for resources, inadequate public-private partnerships, and costs in terms of time, energy, and money.

A study of more than 120 risk and vulnerability assessments (RVA) by Swedish authorities, showed large discrepancies regarding how they analyse and present risk information. This makes it difficult to compare and synthesize information and creates frustration and resignation amongst risk managers at public authorities, which ultimately may lead to a decreased willingness to use others’ data. This is likely to have a detrimental effect on the ability to identify risk, analysing it, and implement suitable risk-reducing measures. Yet, opportunities exist to improve the situation.

3. CONCLUSIONS
- Aggregation is facilitated when different actors use the same scales and quantitative units (frequencies, numbers, volumes, areas) when expressing risk and supplement their assessments with transparent motivations.
- Inter-organizational trust and partnerships are promoted through joint workshops, exercises, and trainings as well as by developing common risk scenarios, consequence dimensions, and scales and indicators for assessing risk across authorities at all administrative levels.
- Future research should look into the possibilities of making better use of visual aids, including how Geographical Information Systems (GIS) can be applied to support the production of individual RVAs and syntheses of their outputs, to reduce the time and cognitive load of processing vast amounts of data.
- Measures to enhance the possibility of aggregating disaster risk information from multiple actors need to be based on a combination of top-down and bottom up approaches, where guidelines and directives are negotiated with the stakeholders that are meant to abide by them.

"MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF AGGREGATING DISASTER RISK INFORMATION FROM MULTIPLE ACTORS NEED TO BE BASED ON A COMBINATION OF TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM UP APPROACHES"
Standardisation and Risk Governance
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A Multi-Disciplinary Approach

1. PURPOSE OF THE BOOK
A variety of standardization processes and applications of standards may influence our judgements of risk: the organizing of risk governance, and accordingly our ways of behaviour. They include regulations of international and national cooperation in risk governance and crisis management, regulation of infrastructure and industrial sectors, and risk management in activities and duties within or among organizations.

The idea to analyse standards as a safety and security technology evolved slowly. Compared to the penetrating impact they have on the organization of society, standards and standardization have been underestimated phenomena within the social sciences. Standardization has rarely been linked to risk governance in systematic ways before. But standards are everywhere, and we often take them for granted. The authors started by taking another look into their ongoing projects, trying to see the standards and standardization processes going on. It is when you start to look for standards that you really see them. The more you dig into them, the more you understand that standards are not only technical specifications and guidelines to support efficient risk governance. They also contain social, political, economic and organizational aspects. A new world of knowledge about risk governance has opened.

2. ABOUT THE BOOK
The chapters are organized around three main topics:
1. Standardisation of risk management draw on examples from efforts to standardize complex risk pictures, disaster risk management and risks in health care.
2. Impact of standardisation processes is analysed based on examples from terrorism and pre-crime risk analysis, cyber security and tools for risk mapping.
3. Standardization of risk in business activity include analysis of trading, regulation, business cooperation and UN guiding principles of business and human rights.

3. CONCLUSIONS
Standardization and standards could impact risk governance in different ways. The most important lessons drawn from the present contributions could be condensed into three topics:
1. How standardization may impact on power relations and interests
2. How standardization may change flexibility in decision-making, communication, and cooperation
3. How standardization could (re)direct attention and risk perception.
A Nordic Model for Societal Security?
Convergence and Divergence

“What are the similarities and differences when it comes to how Nordic security is framed and practiced today?”

1. PURPOSE OF THE BOOK
This forthcoming book presents new analyses and original findings emerging from the NordSTEVA network’s multi-year research project on the discourses, practices, and technologies of security in the Nordic countries. It asks:

- What are the similarities and differences when it comes to how Nordic security is framed and practiced today?
- Did Nordic societies come to be organised around a shared “model” for security work, and to what extent does such a model relate to the logic and terminology of “societal security”?

Featuring leading Nordic scholars from the disciplines of international relations and critical security studies, the book explores the various ways in which security became (re)formulated and done in the Nordic countries after the Cold War and in the new millennium, as well as the implications of new threat constructions in these societies during the 90s and 00s.

2. THE NORDIC MODEL
The notion of a “Nordic model” is commonly associated with the Nordic region. However, this often tends to refer to shared patterns in the provision of welfare, e.g. how labour policies, education, healthcare, pensions, etc. all developed rather similarly throughout the 20th century in these societies, leading to a certain degree of administrative, socio-economic, and cultural regional coherence.

- On the one hand, to what extent is it reasonable to suggest that a similar “Nordic model” has emerged in the area of post-Cold War security?
- On the other, to what extent did the traditional Nordic welfare model lay the foundations for, socially conditioned, and make possible the ways in which security is done in these countries today?

The book departs from the assumption that there are, at least visibly, some signs of convergence suggesting the existence of a shared Nordic model for societal security. For instance, the Nordic Council has come to endorse the concept, and several high-level reports and ministerial declarations frame regional security cooperation precisely in this way. The terminology has also diffused to a certain extent among Nordic civil servants, policy advisors, and government agencies working in the areas of internal security, public safety, crisis management, and counterterrorism. The terminology is even undergoing international standardisation, in an initiative led by Nordic practitioners.

Taken together, this points towards societal security as an emerging narrative, as a kind of imaginary constructed by certain influential actors, to serve as a potential model for how to frame and do security in Nordic societies.

3. THEMES
The book encourages each author to investigate both convergences and divergences of Nordic security, and does so by asking the following thematic questions:

1. What are the guiding concepts, discourses, tools, resources, policies, technologies, etc. that make up security in a particular Nordic country or sector? I.e. how is security “done”?
2. What socio-historical developments got us there? I.e. why does it look the way it does today?
3. With what broader effects or implications?

“The book departs from the assumption that there are, at least visibly, some signs of convergence suggesting the existence of a shared Nordic model for societal security.”
1. Purpose of the Study

The aim of the research project Colours of Security is to investigate the ‘chromatology’ of security, or to study colour in relation to people and security. In practice this means doing various kinds of semiotic analyses of how colour is used in and becomes a part of the social field of security. Colour is an important marker as to how our societies operate in symbolic terms, even though colours have lost some of their semiotic strength through time.

The project provides a new entry-point into the international political sociology of security. In addition to developing this innovative theoretical framework, the project has produced rich empirical case studies into chromatological systems of signification in the security field, understood in a broad way. The project has also allowed for new forms of societal engagement as it has combined social scientific research with the creation of visual art.

2. Main Findings

The project has focused on specialized groups and their use of colour rather than a general grammar for colour-use. In the field of security, such specialized groups have included not only military and policing professionals, but everyday uses of colour such as work-clothing and reflective vests.

- Colour-use is part and parcel of political meaning, making it play vital roles in social sorting.
- The use of colour is quintessential in making certain things and people public or visible, attaching to them certain modes of being and action, identifying, classifying and hierarchizing them, or attaching them with rights and duties.
- The coloration of military uniforms has been a key part in the evolution of the social constitution of the battlefield and the related social imaginaries and practices of soldiering that have turned citizens into soldiers and soldiers into hunters.
- Colour is a necessary feature of national flags that can make the intangible international into a haptic experience and that are major constitutive elements of the modern international state system.
- The coloration of police uniforms and vehicles matters as they make the expected norms police should abide by visible and affect which kinds of citizen-police relations and political spaces the presence of the police produce and invite.
- Colour-use in relation to peace can have at least two kinds of functions: it can operate symbolically or as a formal act that may even be codified in international law as with the use of the white flag.
- Chromophobia or colour-avoidance and various forms of pigmentocracy operate intersectionally from skin-tone to representations of climate change to produce hierarchies within international politics.

“THE USE OF COLOUR IS QUINTESSENTIAL IN MAKING CERTAIN THINGS AND PEOPLE PUBLIC OR VISIBLE, ATTACHING TO THEM CERTAIN MODES OF BEING AND ACTION”
Planning for the unknown
Nordic strategies of building resilience

"WITH STRATEGIES OF RESILIENCE, STRATEGY IS REDUCED TO A MATTER OF FINDING THE RIGHT ARCHITECTURE TO COPE WITH FUTURE CHALLENGES, AND DOES NOT ENTAIL A DESCRIPTION OF THAT FUTURE - AS THE FUTURE IS BASICALLY UNKNOWN"

1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The study looked at different resilience approaches in the Nordic countries of Norway, Sweden and Denmark and the role of planning and strategy in an increasingly uncertain security landscape.

In public debates, governmental reports, plans and strategy papers in Norway, Sweden and Denmark from 2011 to 2017 it identified three main concepts of resilience:

- **Robust Resilience**: Often implies individual self-sufficiency and survival, physically and mentally.
- **Personal or organisational inner strength and ability to adapt and bounce back.**
- **Threats are seen as external to the individual or the organisation.**

- **Reflexive Resilience**: The ability to reflect on how we ourselves play a role in producing new threats.
- **Often seen as a process of learning, where we gradually become aware of the future (unknown) consequences of our own actions.**

- **Organised Resilience**: The institutionalisation of resilience, either robust or reflexive.
- **In this type, resilience becomes a management tool for handling uncertainty.**

Resilience has become the standard answer in the Nordic countries, but to what? It does not entail a vision for how we would like our future to unfold, but rather nourishes an inward-looking and anxious mode of existence.